VOLUME 16-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOT ALL THAT GLITTERS IS GOLD – LIMITATIONS ON EQUITY CROWDFUNDING REGULATIONS
Jamie Hopkins, Esq. and Katie Hopkins

THE CROWDFUNDING ACT: A NEW FRONTIER
Lindsay Sherwood Fouse

A PLAGUE OF LOCUSTS: THE JOBS ACT AS FOE MORE THAN FRIEND
Amy Coleman

CASE NOTES

COMCAST V. BEHREND: THE CLASS ACTION CHANNEL IS STILL SCRAMBLED
Joseph Krebs

COMMENTS

CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFENSE OF ARBITRATION HAS GONE TOO FAR
Alexander C. Hyder

‘WORKING FROM HOME’ OR ‘SHIRKING FROM HOME’: McMILLAN V. CITY OF NEW YORK’S EFFECT ON THE ADA
Mary Hancock

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NOT ALL THAT GLITTERS IS GOLD – LIMITATIONS OF EQUITY CROWDFUNDING REGULATIONS

JAMIE HOPKINS AND KATIE HOPKINS

Many startup companies have aspirations of being a Fortune 500 company, but without adequate access to funding many companies will neither maximize their potential nor meet their business objectives. The World Bank publishes an annual report on conducting business throughout the world, stating which countries are best for starting a new business.  One of the major factors in the World Bank’s ranking of ease of doing business is the ease and reliability of getting credit and access to funding.

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THE CROWDFUNDING ACT: A NEW FRONTIER

LINDSAY SHERWOOD FOUSE

At a time when stagnant economic growth and persistent unemployment seem to be the new normal for the United States, equity crowdfunding has been offered as a potential panacea for many of today’s economic woes. Crowdfunding has garnered
support from leading academic and business minds, and perhaps more surprisingly, from politicians and bureaucrats on both sides of the aisle.

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A PLAGUE OF LOCUSTS: THE JOBS ACT AS FOE MORE THAN FRIEND

AMY COLEMAN

Securities Law – The Jumpstart Our Businesses Startups Act–Emerging Growth Companies– The Act’s deregulation of a heavily regulated stock market flies in the face of the historical importance of disclosure in Securities Regulation and the potential dangers may be displayed in a case analysis of the Initial Public Offerings of Facebook, Inc. and Twitter, Inc.

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COMCAST V. BEHREND: THE CLASS ACTION CHANNEL IS STILL SCRAMBLED

JOSEPH KREBS

CLASS ACTION – FRCP RULE 23 – CLASS CERTIFICATION – The United States Supreme Court in recent years has placed a significant number of hurdles in the path of plaintiff’s looking to certify their claims as class actions.  While the Court’s latest decision further erodes the plaintiff’s ability to gain certification, a significant number of questions have been left unanswered and a considerable amount of judicial refinement is going to be necessary before it can be determined if class actions remain a viable form of litigation. – Comcast Corp v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S. 2013).

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CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFENSE OF ARBITRATION HAS GONE TOO FAR

ALEXANDER HYDER

ABRITRATION AGREEMENTS – COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS –FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT –Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court of the United States has been attempting to shrink lower court dockets with decisions both protecting and promoting the use of arbitration.  What seems commendable in the abstract, however, has come at a steep price in reality.  Consumers and other small-dollar claimants are kept from effectively vindicating their rights under consumer and anti-trust law, thereby permitting injurious conduct to go undeterred, unnoticed, and unsettled.  The problem appears to have climaxed following the Court’s decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, in which the Court cemented the enforceability of arbitration clauses with collective action waivers once held to be unconscionable under state contract law.  These provisions, increasingly found in standard form adhesion contracts, bind parties of grossly unequal bargaining power to bilateral arbitration without the ability of cost sharing, collaboration, or class actions.  In effect, these provisions operate to immunize the larger drafting party from liability for violations of consumer and anti-trust law.  This paper explores the underlying cause of the issue, as well as the effects of the Court’s jurisprudence on both corporations and would be claimants.   It also analyzes the diminished, if not eviscerated, ability to privately enforce consumer and anti-trust law, and explores who is in the best position to fill the enforcement void left by the now powerless private actor.

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